

KIPPLE

(59)

"With good discipline, it is always possible to pump into the minds of a class a certain quantity of inert knowledge. You take a text-book and make them learn it. So far, so good. The child then knows how to solve a quadratic equation. But what is the point of teaching a child to solve a quadratic equation? There is a traditional answer to this question. It runs thus: The mind is an instrument, you first sharpen it, and then use it; the acquisition of the power of solving a quadratic equation is part of the process of sharpening the mind. Now there is just enough truth in this answer to have made it live through the ages. But for all its half-truth, it embodies a radical error which bids fair to stifle the genius of the modern world. I do not know who was first responsible for this analogy of the mind to a dead instrument. For aught I know, it may have been one of the seven wise men of Greece, or a committee of the whole lot of them. Whoever was the originator, there can be no doubt of the authority which it has acquired by the continuous approval bestowed upon it by eminent persons. But whatever its weight of authority, whatever the high approval which it can quote, I have no hesitation in denouncing it as one of the most fatal, erroneous, and dangerous conceptions ever introduced into the theory of education. The mind is never passive; it is a perpetual activity, delicate, receptive, responsive to stimulus. You cannot postpone its life until you have sharpened it. Whatever interest attaches to your subject-matter must be evoked here and now; whatever powers you are strengthening in the pupil, must be exercised here and now; whatever possibilities of mental life your teaching should impart, must be exhibited here and now. That is the golden rule of education, and a very difficult rule to follow." --A. N. Whitehead

This journal of opinion and commentary is published and edited by Ted Pauls, 1448 Meridene Dr., Baltimore, Maryland, 21212. Copies may be obtained by writing letters of comment, exchanging your own publication, contributing articles, verse, etc., or paying the cash sum of 20¢ per issue. The esoteric symbol in the address box denotes your status on the mailing list: a number is the number of the last issue you will receive, the letter "T" indicates that we exchange periodicals, and the letter "S" means this is a sample copy. This issue is dedicated to George Wallace, a conscientious advocate of state's rights who has been maligned as a bigot by communistic race-mixers.

-WOKLpress-

jottings

from the editor's desk

JESUS AND THE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE: The voice of sanity has heretofore been barely audible amid the chorus of piercing screams and stentorian bellows which followed the recent decisions of the Supreme Court prohibiting formal prayer recitation and Bible-reading ceremonies in public schools. The controversy provoked by Engel vs. Vitale and intensified by Murray vs. Curlett has until recently been completely dominated by those in vehement opposition to the judgment of the Supreme Court, with the result that it has often seemed a reasonable assumption that the overwhelming majority of American citizens urgently desired a means of over-ruling that venerable tribunal. In this atmosphere of apparent unanimity was born an organized campaign to amend the Constitution which, although founded and originally spearheaded by sincere (albeit misguided) zealots, immediately became a focal point of violent passions and attracted religious bigots, opportunistic politicians, and a pathetic contingent of right-wing extremists. Observed and periodically reported on by this august journal since its inception, this sanctimonious crusade soon began receiving national attention and support, and several of its leaders have been catapulted into sudden prominence merely as a result of their association with the movement. Advocacy of religious observances in public schools soon became virtually mandatory for political aspirants (even Nelson Rockefeller, before going down for the third time, announced his support of a proposed constitutional amendment nullifying the Supreme Court rulings), and public figures in every sphere have evinced a great reluctance to openly criticize the vigorous efforts underway to emasculate the First Amendment. Politicians at the highest levels of government have found themselves vulnerable to pressure exerted by the stalwart defenders of piety: it is generally admitted that a number of Congressmen are opposed to tampering with the Bill of Rights in this fashion but consider it politically inexpedient to vocalize their objections. In view of the vociferation and enthusiasm of the amendment's supporters, which may cause nervous solons to over-estimate their numbers, this is not surprising.

But recently, Rep. Emmanuel Celler's House Judiciary Committee began to conduct hearings on the proposals to amend the Constitution in such a way as to permit religious exercises in public schools, and this singular event appears to have acted as a catalyst for the diverse forces of the opposition (i.e., those individuals who endeavor to defend the sanctity of the First Amendment and deny the necessity or desirability of nullifying the Supreme Court decisions in question). Previously, an aura of unreality surrounded the immoderate efforts of the crusaders to reinstate religious indoctrination in the curriculum of public schools; the liberals and libertarians who should have rushed to the defense of the Supreme Court rulings apparently failed to seriously consider the "crusade to return God to the schools" as a threat to the liberty of this nation. Whatever the reason, it

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is clear that many of those who should have entered the dispute on the side of liberty simply ignored the debate and left the field to the barbarians, and consequently it has often been the case during the course of this controversy that the forces of bigotry and fanaticism have been able to prevail simply because the partisans of sanity and freedom refused to offer resistance. With the opening of the House Judiciary Committee hearings, however, many sensible citizens who had heretofore been content in the role of spectators are beginning to realize that a constitutional amendment reinterpreting a portion of the Bill of Rights is more than the idle speculation of a handful of dogmatists with vermiform minds. This realization has prompted the sort of response which should have occurred several years ago.

Witnesses before Rep. Celler's committee have included some of the most vehement advocates of amendment, running the gamut from Bishop Fulton J. Sheen to Alabama Governor George C. Wallace; and some of the recent testimony has been truly remarkable for its fatuity and appalling narrowness, typified by the ridiculous prediction of Florida Attorney General James W. Kynes that unless the Constitution is amended so as to permit prayer recitation in public schools, "this nation and civilization will fall". But the Congressmen have also invited testimony from opponents of the proposed amendments, and for the first time since the controversy began, individuals are coming forward in substantial numbers to take a position in defense of the First Amendment (and the Supreme Court application of the "establishment" doctrine). Most of the major Protestant denominations decided last year when no one was listening to oppose the return of officially sanctioned religious exercises to public schools, and representatives of these sects have lucidly outlined their position before the Judiciary Committee. Since a major argument of proponents of the "prayer amendment" is that our forefathers came to these shores seeking freedom of worship, the most cogent point made by these representatives of the clergy was that the freedom sought by the Pilgrims and others was precisely this: freedom from governments which supported through their institutions the claims of a specific religion. (There is no question but that religion would be "established" in this sense by adoption of, e.g., the Becker amendment, which provides that schools may legally conduct voluntary religious exercises but fails to define the specific content of these prayer ceremonies. Consequently, the particular prayer or excerpt from Scripture to be recited is left to the discretion of the local school administration. In an area predominantly of one religion, this would allow the majority to effectively establish their religion and promote it through a tax-financed school system. This "establishment of religion" is in no way made less harmful by the technically voluntary nature of the ceremonies, especially since the freedom of the minority to dissent is actually illusory.) Other individuals, including spokesmen for religious minorities and educators, have added to the impressive objections to such an amendment, generally revolving around the incursions on the rights of minorities which invariably accompany any union of church and state.

Nor has this sudden concern with civil liberties and the separation of church and state manifested itself only in testimony before Con-

gressional committees. Many Congressmen report that, for the first time in two years, mail from their constituents on the subject is beginning to favor the Supreme Court decisions and reject the concept of an amendment weakening the First Amendment. The same shift of sympathy is noticeable in the Baltimore press, where--for the first time since the debate began--letters in opposition to a constitutional amendment outnumber those in support of such an amendment. It appears indisputable that, after an unfortunate hiatus, sanity is regaining the upper hand, as the individuals concerned with preserving the principles upon which this nation was founded rouse themselves from a state of lethargy and enter the dispute. The most recent omen to indicate that intelligence may yet defeat emotionalism is an editorial in the Baltimore Sun, this area's liberal newspaper. The Sun had previously interjected only an occasional calm word into the controversy, usually concerning one of the less central aspects of the dispute, and editorially cautioned against turning the school-prayer crusade into a pogrom against non-believers; but in the two years during which the subject of the Supreme Court decisions was tirelessly argued in the letter section of the newspaper, the Sun never stated flatly that a constitutional amendment was undesirable. Finally, however, the newspaper (in an editorial which, ironically, is essentially conservative) stated unequivocally its opposition to the proposed constitutional amendment:

"The pressure in Washington for a prayer amendment to the Constitution is largely an emotional reaction to Supreme Court decisions of 1962 and 1963 which banned state-ordered religious exercises from the public schools. But the general public, including church leaders of many faiths, is beginning to understand that the Supreme Court did not outlaw prayer, the Holy Scriptures or belief in God.

"It said simply that a student of Jewish faith ought not to be required to recite a Christian prayer, or a Buddhist to read a Mormon text, or an atheist to deny his beliefs. The court actually undergirded the free exercise of religion.

"This cherished right, really a dual guarantee, is set forth with utmost clarity in the First Article of the Bill of Rights, which says: 'Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof...'

"That simple statement ought to be allowed to stand, without needless qualification or illumination, however well-intentioned. The great danger of the flood of 147 congressional prayer resolutions is that they might ultimately be interpreted as a restriction upon freedom, rather than an extension.

"In this case, the old warning is highly appropriate: leave well enough alone."

It remains entirely possible that the Constitution will be amended in order to permit religious observances in public schools, although an objective appraisal of the issue cannot avoid the conclusion that a return to former practices and the larger fissure in the "wall of separation between church and state" which would result from passage of such

an amendment would be decidedly unfortunate. But at least future historians will not record that we of this era witnessed the destruction of one of our most important liberties without voicing an objection. The forces of liberty were difficult to marshal, but now that they have at last straggled onto the field of combat they may display a tenacity and skill rivalling that of the Greeks at Marathon.

THE LEGACY OF "JANGO": Officially, the United States government adheres to the often reiterated policy of deploring the overthrow of constitutional governments by force of arms, but this policy has never, so far as I can see, exerted any influence on the practical position and day-to-day activities of the State Department. Occasionally, recognition is briefly withheld from governments established by extra-legal methods, in much the same spirit as a conscientious parent deprives mischievous children of ice cream for a week or so, but it is invariably restored when it becomes apparent that this gesture is without significant effect. When United States interests are directly involved, as in South Vietnam, even this half-hearted concession to officially espoused principles is neglected, and the military junta clever enough to convince American policy-makers that its seizure of power conforms to the goals of the United States is spared even brief isolation from the inexhaustible cornucopia of American economic assistance. Such a policy is obviously appropriate with regard to South Vietnam, where the existing state of emergency and the vast United States investment preclude delay or indecision of any sort, but elsewhere the wisdom of this unrestrained pragmatism is questionable.

When a military coup d'état deposed Brazilian President Joao Goulart, the United States established what is presumably a modern record by applauding the stroke before the ink on Goulart's resignation was completely dry. This astonishing swiftness of reaction was apparently a demonstration of the opinion prevalent within United States government circles that whatever followed Goulart's regime must necessarily be an improvement. Admittedly, the situation as it developed immediately after the coup appeared to justify such optimism and there is little question but that the removal of Goulart from power received widespread popular support. But the new government soon began to bear an uncomfortable resemblance to the standard Latin American right-wing military government. Leaders of the coup proposed to the Brazilian Congress an "Institutional Act" radically expanding the powers of the executive department of the government, and when the Brazilian legislators refused to approve this emergency measure, it was simply imposed as a decree by the military council over the objections and protestations of the civilian authority. Within a few days, Paschoal Mazzilli, the former legislator then serving as transitional President, was replaced by General Humberto Castello Branco, one of the leaders of the coup.

The content of the Institutional Act has been studiously ignored by the press in this country, though the purge of "leftists" given a thin veneer of legality by the Act has received considerable notoriety. The military junta has promised free elections in 1965, and President Castello Branco will administer the government of Brazil until a popularly elected President is inaugurated on January 31, 1966. The Institutional Act permits Castello Branco to exercise virtually absolute power during the next twenty-one months, and if the military leaders actually relinquish power at that time, they will be highly atypical of Latin American military men. The most significant provisions of the Institutional Act provide a foundation for permanent dictatorship. The act empowers the government (i.e., the executive branch, represented by Castello Branco) to dismiss Congressmen, state deputies or city councilmen, and cancel the political rights of any citizen for ten years, for "acts

against democracy, national security, and the probity of public administration". In addition to this, the Institutional Act decrees that Congress must vote within thirty days on any constitutional amendment submitted by the President, while reducing the margin necessary for the adoption of such an amendment from two-thirds of Congress to a simple majority. It is manifest that these two provisions, applied cleverly, are alone sufficient to maintain a dictatorship in Brazil until such time as the masses successfully revolt. The nominal limitation to President Castello Branco's term of office and the life of the Institutional Act is utterly meaningless as a barrier to this design. Free elections may be postponed indefinitely by the adoption of a constitutional amendment; an act of Congress is sufficient to retain the Institutional Act beyond its original limit of twenty-one months. The passage of neither of these legislative acts presents a concrete difficulty to Castello Branco should he decide to remain in control, since he exercises absolute control over Congress by virtue of his ability to dismiss any member of the Senate or Chamber of Deputies on the pretext of anti-democratic acts or action detrimental to the national security or the integrity of public administration. The ambiguity of these proscribed acts allows the President to utilize this provision of the Institutional Act to dismiss from office anyone who opposes him. Of course, President Humberto Castello Branco may possess the integrity and respect for liberty necessary to administer these severe provisions justly; there may actually be free elections next year in Brazil; and a civilian government possessing a public mandate may peaceably accede to power on the last day of January, 1966. But the entire history of Latin American take-overs causes the odds against this happy eventuality to be astronomically high.

The unfortunate potential of this quiet revolution within the Brazilian government has not been publicly recognized by United States policy-makers, who appear confident that President Castello Branco will rescue his country from the excesses of "Jango" Goulart. President Goulart was viewed as a "leftist" who openly and actively courted the support of Brazilian Communists and was, moreover, an incompetent administrator. For these reasons, the United States government was unhappy with Goulart and thus predisposed to cheerfully accept any successor from the political Right. But there is more to be said about Goulart, for no South American politician is quite so uncomplicated as the press in this country attempted to portray Joao Goulart. Another and perhaps more realistic appraisal of the former Brazilian leader held that he was an opportunistic politician, who used the Communists at least as effectively as they used him, and a sincere--if not always intelligent--advocate of social progress and land reform. Whether or not this characterization of Joao Goulart is entirely acceptable to Americans (and it is not to this writer), it is in any case impossible to deny that what popularity Goulart possessed early in his administration was chiefly built upon the promise of economic and social reform. Joao Goulart has now departed--it is not yet possible to determine whether his abrupt departure was, in the final analysis, beneficial or injurious to his nation--but the inequities he sought to reform continue to exist. Unless the new government proves capable of dealing with this situation and applying the necessary reforms, the fall of Goulart will have served only to strengthen Communism in Brazil--for in an under-developed country, Communism cannot be fought in any lasting or meaningful sense by deposing a few public officials who leaned uncomfortably far to the Left; rather, a stable government must attack the basic conditions which render the Communist philosophy attractive to many in Latin America. The prognosis for success in this venture is not optimistic, for governments of the Right are rarely concerned with social and agrarian reform; their

very existence is often dependent upon the maintenance of an inequitable status quo.

One of the reasons for the extreme difficulties experienced by the United States in its relations with the countries of Latin America is that we tend to fear the "leftist" reformers and support the violently anti-Communist governments which, as a consequence of being staunchly opposed to Communism, are generally dominated by a minority of established businessmen and wealthy land-owners anxious to preserve the status quo. As Bishop James A. Pike once observed, the United States "ideologically claims to stand for the right and actually, so often, has stood for the wrong." This unfortunate tendency is undoubtedly due, at least in part, to the fact that we in this country view the internal rivalry between Left and Right in Latin America as a facet of the international competition between capitalism and Marxist socialism. Certainly we must recognize that every shift in the policy of even the most insignificant independent state possesses international ramifications, but we have too often concentrated on this aspect of the struggle while ignoring the local issues on which the rivalry rests. As a result of this misplaced emphasis, we tend to view the issue always as freedom versus Communism, whereas in many cases the actual issue is bread versus starvation, or work versus unemployment. Certain fundamental reforms in the social structure and political system of many Latin American nations are necessary, and advocates of these measures surely qualify as "leftists". The minority of wealthy capitalists and land-owners in these countries oppose reform of any meaningful sort, because they manage to derive much of their economic and political power from the status quo. These oligarchs happen also to be the most devotedly anti-Communist individuals in Latin America, and for this reason their attempts to remain in power receive the active support of the United States. Thus, in Latin America the United States marches out of step with history, struggling to preserve a moribund social structure because of the demands of international politics and unable to comprehend the resultant virulent anti-Americanism which characterizes the sentiments of the lower classes in nearly every Latin American nation.

Unless there is a dramatic reversal of this self-defeating policy, the whole of Latin America will gravitate into the Communist sphere. American foreign policy is at least as much responsible for the Communist presence in Cuba as any other single factor. In the current atmosphere of emotionalistic denunciations of Fidel Castro, few Americans remember (or desire to remember) that Dr. Castro approached the United States for economic assistance first, and only when the State Department adopted an absurd "wait and see" policy and refused to accept his revolution did he look to the Communist bloc for the urgently needed aid. After having come under the influence of the Soviet Union, of course, Castro claimed always to have been a Communist, but this claim was, under the circumstances, dictated by expediency. It is tempting to predict that Cuba would currently be a non-Communist partner of the United States had we reacted differently, but it is not, of course, possible to judge with any degree of certainty the outcome of hypothetical courses of action. It is clear, in any case, that the situation could hardly have been worse had this government been less conservative in dealing with the revolutionary government of Cuba.

A situation is currently developing in the republic of Chile which may parallel rather precisely the situation several years ago of the United States vis-à-vis Cuba. In September, the voters of Chile will go to the polls and elect a president, and there is an excellent chance that Dr. Salvador Allende, a Marxist, will win a plurality. Dr. Allende, as the most Left-leaning candidate on the ballot, receives the support of the Chilean Communists, but denies that he is a Communist. He promises

that, if elected, his government will be "democratic, national and of the people". Dr. Allende's only serious opposition is Senator Eduardo Frie Montalva, a Christian Democrat, and both candidates are sufficiently radical that they admit a willingness to nationalize certain industries (including American-owned copper mines) should the economic situation warrant such action. It appears, therefore, that a decidedly "leftist" government will legally assume power in Chile before the end of this year, and the subsequent reaction of the United States government could easily decide the ultimate fate of Latin America. If the overly cautious "wait and see" attitude which was applied to our relations with Fidel Castro is once again permitted to dominate our foreign policy, the new government of Chile may be forced to seek assistance from Communist nations in carrying out the reforms which both major candidates realize are necessary. This would be a tragic development, ultimately benefitting neither the United States nor the Chilean people, and both Dr. Allende and Senator Frie would without doubt prefer to remain within the Western sphere; but it is a tragic development which can be avoided only if the United States accepts Chile as a democratic socialist nation. If this government refuses to deal with the Chilean President because he is a "leftist" or covertly supports the violent overthrow of the constitutional government by anti-Communist elements, we will do more to damage our principles and goals in Latin America than the concerted efforts of a dozen Goularts.

--Ted Pauls

"It will, no doubt, be a matter of surprise, that in a treatise upon the elements of chemistry, there should be no chapter on the constituent and elementary parts of matter; but I may here observe that the fondness for reducing all the bodies in nature to three or four elements proceeds from a prejudice which has descended to us from the Greek philosophers. The notion of four elements, which, by the variety of their proportions, compose all the known substances in nature, is a mere hypothesis, assumed long before the first principles of experimental philosophy or of chemistry had any existence. In those days, without possessing facts, they framed systems; while we, who have collected facts, seem determined to reject even these, when they do not agree with our prejudices. The authority of those fathers of human philosophy still carry great weight, and there is reason to fear that it will even bear hard upon generations yet to come." --Antoine Lavoisier, in the "Traité Elementaire de Chimie".

"I do not think any reasonable person can doubt that in India, China and Japan, if the knowledge of birth control existed, the birth-rate would fall very rapidly. In Africa the process might take longer, but there also it could be fairly easily achieved if Negro doctors, trained in the West, were given the funds to establish medical clinics in which every kind of medical information would be given. I do not suppose that America would contribute to this beneficent work, because if either party favored it, that party would lose the Catholic vote in New York State, and therefore the Presidency. This obviously would be a greater disaster than the extermination of the human race by atomic war." --Bertrand Russell, in "New Hopes for a Changing World".

"We must dare to think about 'unthinkable' things. We must learn to explore all of the options and possibilities that confront us in a complex and rapidly changing world. We must learn to welcome rather than fear the voices of dissent." --Senator J. William Fulbright, in the celebrated "myths" speech.

LOUIS R. RUKEYSER:

THE SHADE OF THE BANYAN TREE

The schoolboy's axiom has it that a politician thinks of the next election while a statesman thinks of the next generation. Recent developments in India indicate, however, that there may be perils in too long a view as well.

For Jawaharlal Nehru, in the decline of a majestic career, the problem is not breadth of vision but keenness of observation. Guided by his view of what the world should be, the 73-year-old Prime Minister walks with his head in the clouds of the future. But he keeps stumbling over the intractable present.

As he is responsible for so much of the good in his country's Government, so must Nehru take the blame for the failing of not rethinking policy. As a political leader, his dominance discourages dissent; as a policy-maker, he is too frequently a prisoner of his own misconceptions.

Nehru's basic fault arises from the grandeur of his vision. Convinced of the rightness of his design for India, he has transformed policy into dogma. When the dogma proves bad policy, he is annoyed but unconverted.

An example is the dedication of India's Government to the three principles of "socialism, secularism and nonalignment". These Indian dogmas, with the exception of secularism, smack dangerously of prejudices elevated to permanency.

What is worse, the Indian dogmas have not worked. Nehru believes in "socialism" and distrusts capitalists, but it is only capitalist foreign aid that has enabled him to finance his socialist experiments. In the last five-year plan, ending in 1961, Indian private entrepreneurs exceeded their quotas while Government enterprises fell far short; in the present period, both sectors are undergoing difficulties in the face of an inexorably expanding network of Government controls and bureaucratic inefficiency. As one Indian observer suggested plaintively, it is high time for the Government to start being "nonaligned" between public and private enterprises. Though it theoretically approves of both, its policies tend to squeeze the private sector. While no one has suggested that private enterprise could do it alone in India, there is something disturbing about the Government's tendency to turn to theory rather than to plain objective evidences of economic success.

On farm policy, Nehru is pressing ahead toward his ultimate goal of collectivization, despite the historic failure of that policy in Russia and China. In the case of industry, the rigid system of licenses and controls is particularly discouraging to new enterprises. Some foreign capital is scared off by the Government's insistence on Indian majority control. And whatever the merits of the abortive effort to get American aid for the Bokaro steel plant, it is significant that one fact was obscured: India argued that private money was not available for the project (a question on which Indian business men differed); it did not mention that private money was banned. The planners had already deter-

mined that all future Indian steel mills must be in the public sector.

"Nonalignment", in turn, is so inbred in Indian political belief that foreigners are constantly being surprised at how devoutly it continues to be espoused--despite the unmistakable tightening of bonds to the West. In this connection, two unpublished polls taken privately after the Communist Chinese invasion are revelatory. One, a concentrated study of a major Indian city, concluded that President Kennedy could then have carried Bombay as easily as he carried Boston. The other contrasted the views of a cross-section of the nation at large with those of 100 members of Parliament. Both groups looked forward to closer relations with the West. But while 85 percent of the parliamentarians thought India's foreign policy should be "as neutral as possible", the nation at large showed a preference for siding with the West. The surveys detected a strong undercurrent of pro-Western sentiment in both groups, though in the case of the politicians this was masked by ritualistic professions of the glories of nonalignment.

This would seem to indicate three things. First, that Nehru may not be reflecting as broad a popular consensus as is generally assumed and may, in fact, be lagging behind the country at large in his recognition of India's present needs. Second, that any successor bold enough to embrace the West with undisguised fervor might find his task easier than he expected. And third, that the successor might have less difficulty with the public than with the Parliament, schooled as it is in the slogans that constitute the Indian political catechism.

But there is no pressure on Nehru to surrender India's nonalignment; the United States is happy to let it continue, and even grits its teeth in a smile when the Prime Minister demonstrates the "success" of his policy by taking arms from the Soviet Union as well as the West. Virtually all the appearances remain: "Panch Sheel marg", a street named in honor of Indian-Chinese friendship, continues to herald the "five principles of coexistence" on its course through the diplomatic quarter. The Government pretends that the Western jets arriving here next month are just on a "radar-training" exercise and involve no future commitment to come to India's defense. The signing of the partial ban of nuclear tests was widely reported here as another triumph for Nehru's foreign policy.

What is more important is that Nehru himself seems to disregard the significance of what has happened: that nonaligned India, noble champion of Red China, was attacked and humiliated, while Western allies in the area were spared this indignity. Nehru still passionately believes in the rectitude of V. K. Krishna Menon, whom his party forced him to remove as Defense Minister. The aging Prime Minister is as convinced as ever that justice and craft alike reside only in nonalignment. He sees nothing Communist about the Chinese incursions; he views them as a shocking personal betrayal, but hardly as a failure of policy.

Yet time and events are conquering even Jawaharlal Nehru. Bolstered though he is by a too-massive parliamentary majority and too-effusive national adoration, he is beginning to lose his absolute control over policy. The enforced dismissal of Menon was one symptom. Another is the result of last month's government reshuffle, when he forced six Cabinet members and six state chief ministers to resign and devote themselves to rebuilding the Congress party.

Even many who had supported the back-to-the-precincts plan, as a means of revitalizing the dominant party, were disillusioned when it became apparent that the toll had been used by Nehru to weed out the strong pro-Westerners in his Cabinet. One of the ministers removed, S. K. Patil, has said openly that the Administration has suffered from an ideological hatchet job. Another of the "resigned" ministers, Morarji Desai, has solidified his own position by removing a pro-Nehru chief minister

in Gujerat state. And even in Nehru's home state, powerful Uttar Pradesh, the Prime Minister's candidate for chief minister was beaten by Mrs. Sucheta Kripalani, who in addition to being cool to Nehru's policies is the wife of Parliament's unofficial opposition leader.

As evidence mounts that the Prime Minister is losing his grip, the man himself sometimes seems lost. He makes occasional, brief come-backs--rallying support the easy way by talking tough on Kashmir, or demonstrating ruthlessness by reforming his Cabinet--but even the familiar short temper at times appears gone. He sits slumped glumly in Parliament, and when he speaks he is like a tired old schoolmaster repeating long-remembered lessons to slightly retarded children. Never the most concise of speakers, he rambles incessantly now, often ignoring the criticism he has risen to answer. After his speech in a foreign-affairs debate this month, a normally friendly Indian newspaper said he had been "discursive to the point of incoherence".

Such energy as he has is dissipated in an endless round of fringe activities. Hardly a bridge or a school is opened anywhere in India without Nehru there; his generosity in giving time to importuning visitors is legendary. Yet his accessibility to the people is not matched by trust in them. He suppressed the facts of Chinese aggression for years, he has allowed near-dictatorial curbs on the press and he is now concealing the political findings of an inquiry into last year's debacle on the northeast frontier. The theory is still that Papa knows best.

But sometimes even Papa does not know. It is a common complaint that too many of India's diplomats tailor their dispatches to fit Nehru's political predilections. "As in other spheres of governmental activity," commented the Statesman, "there is often a tendency to report only what is palatable to the Prime Minister and generally fits into his pattern of thinking on international affairs."

In December, 1959, when S. K. Patil was still a member of Nehru's Cabinet, he memorably described the Prime Minister as "a banyan tree under whose shade millions take shelter", adding that "in the shade of the banyan tree nothing grows". The problem has intensified since then, especially in the light of the removal from the Cabinet of its most forceful personalities. There are those who maintain that last month's resignation plan was really aimed at Nehru himself, and that the Prime Minister--by failing to insist on departing--sabotaged its purpose. Whatever the truth of this antagonistic appraisal, Nehru has made it difficult for his contemporaries to acquire independent status. As for the future, when I asked one prominent Indian to name "the coming young politicians", he replied: "You tell me; I don't know any."

Perfection is elusive; neither a business executive nor a world statesman can be expected to have more than a good batting average. Nehru's record of leading India into democratic, unified independence gives him an untouchable head start in any final reckoning of his career. But the trouble with fitting events into one's preconceptions, as he has done--instead of adjusting one's preconceptions in the light of events--is that even the finest natural batter is unable to profit by his own strikeouts.

--Louis R. Rukeyser

∟ "The Shade of the Banyan Tree" appeared originally in the Morning Sun.7

"Men were thought of as free--in order that they might be judged and punished; but consequently every action had to be regarded as voluntary, and the origin of every action had to be imagined as lying in consciousness. In this way the most fundamentally fraudulent characteristic of psychology was established as the very principle of psychology itself." --Friedrich Nietzsche, in "The Twilight of the Idols".

In the days just before the opening of the New York World's Fair, several people saw fit to ask me The Question. They asked it with quizzical looks on their faces and quavery apprehension in their voices.

"You don't support this stall-in thing, do you?"

And since a monosyllabic retort was apparently solicited in every case, I always responded with an agreeable "No," which seemed to have a salutary effect on my questioners' appearance and bearing. Every time I said "No" (or better still, "No, I don't"), they would assume a cheerful air and stride away, perhaps feeling that there was hope for me yet.

to stall a movement

But two questions arise from the real-life experiences of which I have just spoken. The first is, just how much does my opinion matter, and the answer to that one is, "Not much." Anyone who was really comforted by my avowal of non-support for the stall-in was grasping at narrow straws indeed. The second question is: Why should a particular tactic--in this case, the proposal to tie up traffic to the World's Fair by having people deliberately stall their cars--constitute the point at which anyone's wholehearted support of a social upheaval wavers?

In order to approach an answer to the second question, let us consider some of the popular labels which describe the tactics heretofore used by the civil rights movement. One such label is "passive resistance". Does a stall-in, such as described above, qualify under that term?

Some would contend that it does, just as might any action in which people dramatically refrain from cooperating with "the system". This takes care of the resistance part, but what of passivity? We should understand that passivity, in the context of a mass movement such as the civil rights movement, cannot be and is not synonymous with disengagement; rather, it is a state of deep involvement. It does not necessarily imply impediment--i.e., the deliberate stoppage of human commerce. A sit-in demonstration at a segregated lunch counter may cause indignant whites to avoid that counter, but--if so--they do so of their own accord. Certainly, they may feel that the imposing sight of people "sitting in" compels them to avoid the lunch counter, but in the final analysis they compel themselves to do so. The burden of decision does not rest with the participants in the demonstration. If it effectively lives up to its name, a stall-in, on the other hand, leaves no opportunity for that sort of voluntarism. A stall-in is thus an es-

entially negative tactic, and as such it is decidedly not passive. Participants do not ask other involved parties what they are going to do; in effect, they tell them. This is more "active provocation" than "passive resistance".

Another label favored by activists is "direct action". This implies that a given move brings about genuine confrontation with the people or institutions capable of causing reforms, and that actions undertaken are therefore direct. When a department store is picketed, there is at least a symbolic confrontation with the management of the establishment. If the desired effect of an action is peaceful persuasion and peaceful revision of unfair policies, both the participants and the public-at-large should be constantly aware of who and what, specifically, is being made the target of protest. A stall-in is not a direct action, but a sort of scattershot technique with no real focal point. And the extent to which an act of protest is constructive is determined in large measure by the existence of, and the characteristics of, its focal point.

What of "non-violence"? The act of stalling one's automobile on a crowded highway is certainly not an overtly violent act. But again, the matter of the degree and kind of provocation involved must arise. There is more to non-violence than the maintenance of it in the individual and collective behavior of advocates of reform. Consideration must also be taken of the likelihood (or probability) of indirectly causing violence. There is an essentially provocative quality in the act of stalling traffic, particularly in view of the above-mentioned absence of a focus for demonstration. In the face of unfocused provocation, heretofore disinterested or uninvolved parties are made less rather than more receptive to change.

Finally, in considering the legitimacy of the stall-in as a tactic of protest, we come to the question, "What might Gandhi think?"--for the philosophy of the spiritual father of contemporary non-violent action is highly pertinent. Gandhi is rather specific. Speaking of demonstrations protesting the sale of foreign cloth in Indian shops (a consideration which may seem paltry, but which was tied up with the great issue of Indian nationalism), Gandhi advised his followers, "You must seek to win over the buyer or the seller by your gentleness, not by the awe of numbers...You may not obstruct traffic." (See "Non-Violent Resistance", p. 336.)

Proponents of the stall-in argued that a few hours of inconvenience for "the white man"--note the unfocused wrath--would be hardly uncalled-for when compared with the three hundred or more years of indignity suffered by Negro Americans. Such an appeal is emotionally moving, but rather shallow intellectually. Reference to some of the very mundane problems which a "successful" stall-in might bring about--doctors unable to reach critically ill patients, to mention one oft-cited hypothesis--would appear to be adequate rebuttal. The "wrong-for-a-wrong" argument is

not unlike that used by advocates of capital punishment, and I for one feel that it is always devoid of merit.

Because I have dealt with "slogans" here, and the degree to which certain tactics adhere to them, it should not be assumed that guidelines like "passive resistance", "direct action", "non-violence" or "Gandhianism" are or should be unchanging ones. My point is that all tactics should be examined critically, as should all criteria for determining their efficacy. If reasonable guidelines are absent, the way is left open for chaos from which no one may profit. It is especially important that advocates of civil disobedience set up laws of conduct for themselves, whether written or unwritten--laws which are founded on more ethical and humanitarian grounds than those which are deemed unjust. I like to think that the World's Fair stall-in failed to materialize mostly because the responsible people who make up the greatest part of the civil rights movement simply wouldn't let it.

--Joe Pilati

"While there was strong criticism in the United States of the visit of the Soviet leaders, Bulganin and Khrushchev, to India in 1955, because apparently diplomatic ties were being strengthened between New Delhi and Moscow, there was another side mostly neglected by Americans. In a subtle way the interests of the Indian Communist party were sacrificed for the inscrutable interests of Russia. Bulganin and Khrushchev spoke glowingly of India's progress. In Calcutta, Bombay, and New Delhi they saluted the efforts of Nehru to ensure world peace. Congress had become respectable in the eyes of Communists--at least of those who lived in Moscow. How could Indian Communists attack the Congress party as reactionary and the tool of the West?" --T. Walter Wallbank, in "A Short History of India and Pakistan".

"Religion being of necessity a spring of action, and also bound up with a scale of values, no man of genuinely religious feeling can be perfectly indifferent towards religions which to him seem to turn his values topsy-turvy, and so inevitably in the long run lead to actions which to him seem wrong. He may even see clearly that other religions have very good points, and yet be forced to judge them adversely because, in his opinion, they move less quickly towards the good than his own. But in all questions of toleration the old though too frequently disregarded principle of tolerating the man but attacking the ideas should at least be adopted." --Julian Huxley, in "Religion Without Revelation".

"...a dangerous ambition more often lurks behind the specious mask of zeal for the rights of the people than under the forbidding appearance of zeal for the firmness and efficiency of government. History will teach us that the former has been found a much more certain road to the introduction of despotism than the latter, and that of those men who have overturned the liberties of republics, the greatest number have begun their career by paying an obsequious court to the people, commencing demagogues and ending tyrants." --Alexander Hamilton, in "The Federalist", Number 1.

"Religion perceives that civil liberty affords a noble exercise to the faculties of man, and that the political world is a field prepared by the Creator for the efforts of mind. Free and powerful in its own sphere, satisfied with the place reserved for it, religion never more surely establishes its empire than when it reigns in the hearts of men unsupported by aught beside its native strength." --Alexis de Tocqueville, in "Democracy in America".

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As you state in your remarks concerning "The Deputy", one of the defenses offered for the unwillingness or inability of Pope Pius XII to publicly condemn Nazism and its resulting barbarisms was the fear that Catholics in Nazi-controlled countries might be made to suffer for the outspoken views of their leader. I can hardly call the denial of this assertion anything but ludicrous, when it is remembered that a modern-day counterpart to such thinking has recently occurred. The recent Ecumenical Council meeting in Rome, under Pope Paul VI, has refused to take an affirmative stand on the proposed resolution condemning anti-Semitism. The reason offered for this refusal is that such a statement, indicating tacit disapproval of their policies, would therefore serve to alienate many of the Arab countries which share amicable relations with the Vatican and might jeopardize the Catholic inhabitants of those nations. The moral responsibility to act is clear in this case, and the refusal of the Council to issue a directive--even a mildly worded one--deploring the practice of anti-Semitism, points up the utter worthlessness and superficial examinations of the Council. No religion, however secure or omnipotent it may presume to be, can afford to totally ignore other religions. Pope Paul has already shown his concern for the faith (or non-faith) of others on his recent trip to the Holy Land. Fear of bodily harm or suppression is a valid (though hardly excusable) defense to plead for the Council's failure to enact an anti-Semitism directive.

There are certain segments of the population who rightly recog-

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nize narcotics addiction as a sickness rather than a voluntary crime, and I understand that certain houses of correction treat addicts as patients rather than criminals. But the system for dealing with narcotics addiction in England is considerably more liberal and does not promote the amount of crime by addicts that is found here. There is an interesting analogous situation in England, however, in reference to the treatment of homosexuals. There, anyone even remotely suspected of being homosexual is looked upon as a criminal comparable to a thief or murderer. This state of affairs has delighted blackmailers, who will systematically unearth an individual's past, and if any traces of homosexual activity are in evidence they can subject him to a rigorous blackmail campaign, threatening to expose his sordid past to public eyes if for any reason he refuses to meet their demands. Blackmail is the rule rather than the exception, and men who have unwittingly committed one minor indiscretion in the past have had their offense assume gargantuan proportions. The similarities between homosexual conduct and narcotics addiction are few; but generally individuals are introduced to both by another person, and where, in either case, the individual is both physically and mentally incapable of resisting the demands of the "habit", any crimes he commits are motivated by a genuine self-preservation instinct and not passion or greed.

One facet of the Walter Breen/Bill Donaho dispute appears to have been overlooked. While I agree in every respect that the actions ousting Breen and the subsequent remarks by Donaho and his associates were

in deplorably bad taste, serving no other purpose than impaling Walter with edged barbs of character assassination, I can see no justification for proposing a general boycott of the Pacificon. The convention is conducted for a great many people, many of whom have and desire absolutely no knowledge of this affair; the only effect a boycott would have on the convention would be to cripple attendance, and in that case it will be the convention members as a whole who will suffer rather than Donaho and the committee alone, who are ostensibly the targets of the boycott. Let us limit reprisals to those actually responsible for the grievance-- i.e., those who ousted Walt Breen and subjected him to an inhumanly callous castigation. (If the boycott is a justifiable weapon of protest at all, then it is appropriate in this particular case. When the NAACP stages a boycott of, say, Murphy's, a national chain of ten-cent stores, the purpose is to bring pressure to bear on the management to revise discriminatory employment practices. In achieving this goal by means of a boycott, it is quite possible that many employees of the company may be inconvenienced, and this is unfortunate since the NAACP has no legitimate grievance with these persons; but this cannot be a major consideration is determining whether or not the boycott is justified in any particular case. The Pacificon Committee is responsible for the arbitrary and patently unjust punitive measures taken against Walt Breen, and the most effective means to protest this dictatorial action is to undermine the convention itself. Non-attendance does not only constitute a meaningful gesture but also incorporates a very real penalty against the offenders in this dispute: provided a sufficient number of individuals join the boycott movement, the Pacificon Committee will be exposed to certain financial difficulties. I do not wish to go on record as being in favor of this possibility, but neither can I promise to shed any tears should it occur; the Pacificon Committee opened this Pandora's box and now they must accept the consequences.)

Your statement to Marty Helgesen, to the effect that were God to appear to you and announce the infallibility of the Catholic Church, it would immediately banish all doubt, is fairly amusing. How would you possibly know that what appeared before you was really God? Hollywood has created some elegant miracles on the screen, and is it not possible that these technical effects might be elaborated upon in order to convince you of God's existence? But even assuming that you ascertained that you were viewing God rather than a skillful application of special effects, what would lead you to believe that His assertion would necessarily be valid? Possibly if God thought it served his needs to convert you to Catholicism, He would do so even if it meant not telling the truth...

"My aim is not to be consistent with my previous statement on a given question, but to be consistent with the truth as it may present itself to me at a given moment. The result is that I have grown from truth to truth..." --Mahatma Gandhi.

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You mentioned the "heterogeneous forces of the Right" in Kipple #56, and that brought to mind some rather interesting incidents. The New Jersey Conservative Party, with which I once had some contact, is an extreme right-wing group--much further Right than the New York Conservative Party, for example. By a striking coincidence, they get a much lower proportion of the vote than do the New Yorkers. But extremist as they are, they are by no means anti-Semitic or anti-Negro. So it was with

some surprise that I noted in a column of other rightist groups in The New Jersey Patriot (a publication of a right-wing group closely associated with the New Jersey Conservatives) the name of the Canadian Intelligence Service, which is distinctly a fascist organization. I was even more surprised to see a directory of rightist organizations published by a fascist outfit in California, which included 2000 groups and publications of every possible right-wing tendency--including the American Jewish Council Against Communism. However, I now think I understand why these odd associations occur. Apparently right-wing extremists like to join every organization and receive every publication in their field, so the typical stalwart of the John Birch Society or Young Americans for Freedom may belong to ten rightist groups and receive seven or eight rightist periodicals. And rightists are always eager to pass along the name and address of other rightist organizations, even if they don't know what the groups' policies may be. Thus a member of the arch-conservative New Jersey Conservative Party once told me that she recommended the New Individualist Review magazine--which takes a stand about as much opposed to that of the Jersey group as one can get and still stay in the right-wing. It is the interlocking membership of rightist organizations and the eagerness with which a conservative will tell his friends about other groups that is responsible for the impression that many people have about the cohesiveness of the American Right. But I agree with you that the Right is really heterogeneous, and some day I may go into that further.

"Only the most sophisticated intelligences understand that 'Communism' is little more, essentially, than a name that is commonly applied, in the loosest fashion, to a variety of state systems which pay lip-service--and often only lip-service--to an ideological tradition that originates with 'The Communist Manifesto' of 1848. What Cuba, Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, and Red China have in common today is, above all, the name. Senator Goldwater may think that every regime which calls itself 'Communist' is just like every other regime which calls itself 'Communist'; but one may suspect that, privately, the ideologists in the Kremlin snort with indignation at the notion that Castro's regime in Cuba, for example, is a genuinely 'Communist' one. (It was only when he desperately needed aid from Moscow that Castro decided to call it 'Communist'.)" --Louis J. Halle, in The New Republic, May 16, 1964.

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It's gratifying to find that Anti-Darwinism Is Not Yet Dead in the pages of Kipple. As you may remember, my principal objection to the standard evolutionary doctrine is my doubt that survival characteristics could develop through evolution when so many of them would not provide for survival when they first appear, before they evolve toward something useful. I also find it hard to believe that all forms of life have failed to acquire numerous survival techniques and attributes that are compatible with those they already possess: why, for instance, the dog should not have evolved to superkeen eyesight in addition to that fantastically good nose. There are a couple of things doubtful about the arguments you advance in this current issue. The oyster, for instance, is a creature that I respect inordinately because its personality resembles mine in critical respects. But I must point out that something is awry with evolutionary theory if the oyster has not evolved for the length of time you credit him with remaining the same trustworthy self. His environment has altered in significant respects over that span of time: coastal waters have become mountain slopes, the sea has grown

saltier, there have been ice ages and extensive hot spells, and there have been other excellent provocations for him to adapt to meet changing conditions, as well as to change in response to the different forms of life that may attempt to prey upon him, assuming that there is some other form of life on the planet foolhardy enough to produce an individual with the bravery to be the first of his kind to try to eat an oyster. I have also suspected for a long time that the rabbits so frequently cited as proof of what a little more speed would do for you would be quite likely to escape from predators so successfully that they would immediately breed like rabbits and would consume their natural food supplies so quickly that the new trait would disappear through starvation. (According to the modern theory of evolution, a characteristic cannot arise unless it is useful at every stage of its evolution, and there is no evidence that this has ever occurred. It often appears to individuals lacking sufficient training in the biological sciences that traits have evolved which were neutral (non-adaptive) or even harmful (inadaptive) in their rudimentary stages, but upon examination of particular examples this view is invariably discredited. It is necessary to remember that, in order to be accounted adaptive, a given characteristic need not be outstandingly useful; a "survival characteristic" is defined as one which increases, however minutely, the efficiency of its possessor. From our superior position as beneficiaries of the evolutionary process, highly imperfect stages of certain characteristics often appear "useless"; but just as, in the land of the blind, the one-eyed man is king, even a very imperfect stage of an adaptive characteristic is an advantage over the complete absence of that characteristic. Re your second point: I explained in replying to your earlier objections to Darwinian evolution that attributes which seem advantageous to us might have been unable to develop in a given species for a number of reasons, not the least of which being the inability of the genetic equipment of a specific class of animals to produce an innovation which, in retrospect, is seen to be desirable. No species actually produces all of the possible combinations of genes available to it, and no trait can develop, as you point out, unless its formative stages are useful. Even more important as a reason why certain attributes never arise is that, although it utilizes random variation, natural selection as a process is highly oriented (to survival)--with the result that no creature can develop a trait unless there is definite environmental pressure in that direction. It is this factor which has rendered the various teleological interpretations of evolution so attractive to many. To comment on your specific example, I can envision no particular advantage for a dog in possessing extremely keen eyesight; in the context of the natural habitat of the animal (i.e., prior to its association with mankind), keen eyesight would not have significantly improved its ability to survive. It is not enough to say that more efficient eyesight would be compatible with existing characteristics; this is probably true, but neutral characteristics do not evolve. There must be a definite need for a specific characteristic before it can arise among a population and become dominant. Keen eyesight is an attribute peculiar to two distinct types of creatures: birds (because no other known sense could substitute for efficient vision, given their mode of existence--the various species of bat being the exception to this rule) and arboreal animals (to whom efficient eyes and especially binocular vision are essential to the development of sure-footedness). Thinking about the animals which have evolved keen eyesight may assist you in understanding why others have not. A highly-developed sense of smell is a great deal more useful to a ground-dwelling carnivorous animal; and since most of them have managed to survive quite nicely by pursuing this path, they have not been subjected to the kind of environmental pressure which would produce a major trend such as that

toward increased efficiency of photoreceptor organs. Were it to arise, the characteristic would probably not be harmful, but a trait must be positively useful--not merely neutral--in order to be produced by evolution. (There is even the possibility that increased efficiency of eyesight would ultimately be injurious to a smell-oriented species such as the dog. Animals relying chiefly on a single sense have brains oriented toward that sense; development of another sense to a high degree would entail increased complexity of another segment of the brain, with results which are not entirely predictable and certainly too tentative and complicated to discuss here.) The environmental changes you listed in making the assertion that oysters should have evolved noticeably in 200,000,000 years are not significant enough to induce radical change. Coastal areas have indeed become mountain slopes (in Western Maryland, for example), but this process occurs so swiftly--in geological terms--that its only result is to exterminate the oyster population in the immediate vicinity of the upheaval. I suppose that if evolution operated as swiftly as would seem necessary to convince most skeptics, the oysters in your area would have adapted to an existence of grazing on mountain slopes and would periodically (during "oyster years") run around Hagerstown disrupting business... The increase in salinity of the oceans has been extremely gradual, and though it probably resulted in certain minor internal changes, I doubt that any major variation in the structure of the oyster could have occurred as a result of this. Alternating ice ages and periods of intense heat would have had no widespread effect on the environment of the oyster (though there would be violent local displacements), because the temperature of the ocean remains fairly constant below a certain depth regardless of surface conditions. As for the matter of the oyster adapting to the tactics of predators, there may be a variety of reasons for the failure of this expected evolution to occur. Quite possibly the natural enemies of the oyster have pursued the same tactics throughout geological history, thus rendering the same defense always appropriate. Another possibility is that development of the shell as a defense was a cul-de-sac, a prison and a fortress simultaneously, so to speak, permitting no possibility of major change once it was established. Finally, your objection to my example of displacement of one type by another within a population of rabbits incorporates several misconceptions which ought to be clarified. It is true that when a population increases dramatically, for whatever reason, its food supply is generally diminished and mass starvation often results. This is, indeed, a continuing process in many environments: increase of predators leads to a drastic decrease of victims, the predators therefore starve on a grand scale, the victims are thus given the opportunity to reproduce without interference, the predators take advantage of the replenished supply of food and begin to increase again, and the entire process begins anew. But your assumption that, if an adaptive variation permitted certain rabbits to more rapidly reproduce and thus outstrip their food supply, "the new trait would disappear through starvation", overlooks two important factors. First, it generally takes hundreds of generations for an adaptive variation to attain dominance within a species, so there is usually a gradual rather than dramatic increase in population. Second, even if the arising of an adaptive variation did result in such a drastic increase, with the consequent diminished food supply and mass starvation, this process would not eradicate the new trait unless the scarcity of foodstuffs was sufficiently serious to cause the extinction of the species. Remember that, in my original example, Mutant A and Norm B were competing for the resources of the same environment, and Mutant A was utilizing an excessive share of those resources. If the greater survival capacity of Mutant A resulted in famine for the species, Mutant A would not be wiped out--precisely the opposite would occur, in

fact. The scarcity of food would accelerate the process by which Mutant A, the superior variation, replaced Norm B, the inferior type, because the less food that is available to the species, the greater the percentage of it that will be devoured by the superior group. Since the situation you postulated increases the environmental pressure and therefore promotes the replacement of the heretofore "normal" variety by the superior one, the survivors of the famine (if any--extinction is possible but not probable under the circumstances) will contain a higher ratio of Mutant A to Norm B than the original population in time of plenty.))

Harry E. Mongold's article shares a failing with "Walden". These theorists who end up with a plaint about how they're being forced to spend money or brag about the amount of money they've saved raise all sorts of suspicions about their real motives. If Mongold had insisted on wearing skirts to work or smoking a water pipe while working with the ordnance, I could sympathize. But when a government worker who makes all his money from taxes and bond purchases refuses to save a little of it through bond purchases, I feel as distrustful of his real motives as I do when Thoreau begins to rattle on and on about how many pennies he has saved by growing this kind of vegetable and how his fruit tree saves him from trips to the nearest supermarket.

You overlook something in your article on foreign policy. Despite your confidence that major nations won't go to war in this day of nuclear armament, don't you remember that the United States engaged in a war against Communists that lasted a couple of years, after the close of World War II. I wouldn't find it hard to believe in a future that contained occasional wars between major powers limited to use of weapons that won't send us all flying into smithereens, much like the situation on which George Orwell bases the conditions in "1984". I can't forget how everyone fretted for two decades between the first two world wars about how we might all be wiped out by gas before we had a chance to be blown up in air raids. There could be big wars in which hydrogen bombs are as idle as gas, simply because the combatants don't want to destroy what they're trying to conquer. (My observations on foreign policy in #58 took account of the likelihood of limited encounters such as the Korean War, and I thought that my "confidence that major nations won't go to war in this day of nuclear armament" was rather clearly qualified: I said that neither side would intentionally initiate the sort of widespread conflict which would almost inevitably escalate into a nuclear exchange (e.g., the invasion of Western Europe by Soviet troops). The situation postulated by Orwell, you neglected to mention, was one in which nuclear weapons had been used on a large scale, had nearly destroyed organized society, and had therefore been banned. The present situation, however, is one in which large-scale conventional warfare, particularly if it involved the territory of a nuclear power, would almost certainly escalate into a thermonuclear war. As for the assertion that "combatants don't want to destroy what they're trying to conquer", this was refuted eloquently by a fellow named Harry Warner, writing in Kipple #23: "Assume that it is possible to make nuclear bombs which would render very large surrounding areas totally unfit for any type of life for decades to come (...) without causing similar complete destruction to spread over the entire world. Isn't it likely that both the United States and Russia would give serious consideration to their use? Neither nation needs the land and space that the other possesses. (...) Russia could use the factories and food-producing resources of the United States but could continue to survive without them; the United States wouldn't have much use for Russia's possessions." Admittedly, this comment concerned the possibility of utilizing high-yield thermonuclear weapons to sterilize vast areas and not the use of nuclear bombs, per se, but it illustrates the truism that conquest is no longer the chief goal of war.))

I'm not in accord with the way the Pacificon Committee acted on the Breen case. But I don't think that endless diatribes on the matter are doing anyone any service, when they merely rehash what has already been said and present no new information. Moreover, by accident or intent, you have distorted the basis for the Committee's action by being unspecific about their reasons. You can hardly refuse the Committee the right to repeat in detail its reasons in Kipple, since a good many of your readers may be getting information on this matter only from you. (William L. Donaho and Alva Rogers have received copies of my remarks, and any corrections they may offer will certainly be published in this periodical.) I would not be altogether certain that you have kept actionable material out of this article in Kipple #58, either. For one thing, there are several states in which an individual can be libeled if a true statement that damages his reputation or affects his livelihood consists of a reference to something that occurred many years ago and is resurrected without due cause. If you circulate Kipple in any of these states, you could theoretically get into a lot of trouble this way. I don't see the relevancy of your hypothetical case of a teenage girl who might get knocked up at a convention. Unless she were young enough for a statutory rape situation to develop, the worst that could happen would be a paternity or bastardy action, and I find it hard to believe that a convention committee would be dragged into this. (Inebriated convention attendees are not always overly scrupulous as regards the age of temporary bedmates. I am not entirely certain what the position of the convention committee would be (legally) if an attendee, to use the vernacular, "messed with jailbait", but this would certainly be no less serious than the hypothetical situation on which the Committee's exclusion of Walt Breen was based--i.e., a homosexual pursuing his rather unusual sexual interests at the Pacificon.) I don't like the handling of the Breen case, my high opinion of Walter has not changed in the least because of the trouble, but I would not take the stand that a convention committee should not have the right to withhold membership privileges. I'd hate to see the natural sympathy for Walter because of this trouble establish a precedent that would prevent the exclusion from future conventions of genuinely undesirable individuals.

"Those who preach this doctrine of loving their enemies are in general the greatest persecutors, and they act consistently by doing so; for the doctrine is hypocritical, and it is natural that hypocrisy should act the reverse of what it preaches. For my own part I disown the doctrine, and consider it as a feigned or fabulous morality; yet the man does not exist that can say I have persecuted him, or any man, or any set of men, either in the American Revolution, or in the French Revolution; or that I have, in any case, returned evil for evil." --Thomas Paine, in "The Age of Reason".

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These folks who are blaming Pope Pius XII for not interfering to save the lives of the Jews in Hitler's extermination camps forget that the Roman Catholic Church is interested in saving the souls of men, not their bodies. The Pope therefore acted properly in accord with his office as head of the Church. If the Catholic Church took sides between nations at war, it would have destroyed itself long ago by siding with a loser. In any case, arguing the question now is just thrashing moldy straw--a waste of time, paper and ink.

Art Springer's idea of a non-violent force is a typical silly "do-gooder" idea. If any group pulled such a fool stunt the Russian com-

mander would order them out of the way, and when they disobeyed he would order his troops to fire. Net result: a decrease in the number of live fools.

Springer also speaks of a United Nations army. Where could the U.N. get the men to fill the ranks of such an army? Every man on earth is either a citizen of or a subject of some government to which he owes allegiance and whose authority over him is paramount.

Let us examine a suppositious case. Assume that there is a U.N. Army, in which there are 5000 American citizens; very serious race conflict breaks out in this country, and the U.N. sends in its army to protect the Negroes from massacre. What would happen? The President would issue a proclamation drafting all Americans in the U.N. army into the U.S. army, and order them to attack the U.N. troops. He would remind the U.N. that it is not a sovereign nation and therefore it has no legal right to wage war, and that its troops are therefore not entitled to the protection of the laws of war as defined by the practices of nations throughout modern history. Because of this, their status would be that of armed bandits invading this country, and when rounded up they could be executed as common criminals. Any Americans among them would be guilty of treason and armed rebellion.

In fact, the sending of a detachment of armed troops into the territory of another nation is actually an act of war--e.g., the Canadian troops on Cyprus. Unless Canada declares war on Cyprus, the government of Cyprus would be justified in treating these troops as armed bandits.

Derek Nelson is right when he says that we lost both world wars. Show me what we gained to balance our losses in men and wealth? (Well, we aren't ruled by the Germans today; that should be some consolation, even from your anti-central government viewpoint.) After the Second World War we even paid \$100 billion indemnity to our enemies.

Nelson is also right when he says that we are going down hill. I am an old man, but I consider my chances of seeing this nation broken up in my remaining lifetime as better than even. We have been governed by dogooder fools more interested in foreigners than Americans for 30 years and more. The Suez incident was typical. We turned on our two best allies and backed our two worst enemies, Egypt and Russia. If we had minded our own business, Israel alone would have crushed Egypt, killed off Nasser, and prevented the light of civilization from being extinguished in North Africa. Israel is the only friend we have in the Near East. Custardheads sitting drinking beer and yakking as to how to put the world right forget that two-thirds of the people of this world hate us with a high and holy hatred as the epitome of the white man.

Ernie Rome's remarks about cops classify him exactly. He did not get beaten up for obeying the law and minding his own business. He has and expresses the view of a petty criminal, opposed to all law. I wonder if he himself could pass the mental and physical tests for the police force?

Helgesen is tiresome. It is a free country and if he wishes to be a Roman Catholic, that is his privilege. But why waste time and ink and paper claiming that the Pope has any more authority over another man than my tomcat? The Roman Catholic Church has murdered more human beings in its attempts to rule--and to tax--all mankind than all the warlords.

Re my own letter: When A. G. Smith praises you, you have really deserved praise. And I did not call Crispin a sheriff's deputy, but a sheriff's volunteer--i.e., a guy the local sheriff had to handcuff to get him into the army in wartime. (Sorry--I was unfamiliar with the term and assumed you meant sheriff's deputy.)

I am getting peeved at Borsella's obtuseness. What are the mental

processes of a person who thinks that a man who has lived half a lifetime as a disciplined soldier would be an anarchist? And why should I be religious? Religion is the enemy of both freedom and knowledge. Are all conservatives Christian? I know a few conservative Moslems and many conservative Jews, and I suppose there must be conservative Buddhists, et al. To whom does Borsella consider that she owes loyalty? She sounds as though it's just to "me, myself and I". I will explain again: A virtuous action is one that tends to promote the survival of the individual, of his descendants, of his in-group, of his out-group and of the human race as a whole--in that descending order of importance. The only exception to this is that sometimes it is necessary for a man to sacrifice himself to save his descendants. If it was necessary for me to visit a movie while suffering from a contagious disease, in order to save my own life or the life of my son, I would do so with a clear conscience regardless of the consequences to others.

Loyalty to your in-group, i.e., to your blood relatives, is just loyalty to that strain in the human race genetically closest to you. Such loyalty in itself promotes individual survival; remember the story of the bundle of sticks, unbreakable together, but easily broken one by one.

I'll bet a five spot that Kevin Langdon is just as prejudiced as I am. I said I was prejudiced in favor of my own kind and my own nation. Several times in my life I have been in a situation where it was kill or be killed, and being prejudiced in favor of myself, I killed the other man. I suppose that Mr. Unprejudiced Langdon would have stood still and took the bayonet to show that he had no prejudice in favor of himself. The difference between he and I is that I am honest enough to admit my prejudice.

Then there's John Boston, who believes in free speech for his side but for no one else. That is a trait common to both Communists and Nazis. Which are you, John?

"...no private person has any right in any manner to prejudice another person in his civil enjoyments because he is of another church or religion. All the rights and franchises that belong to him as a man, or as a denizen, are inviolably to be preserved to him. These are not the business of religion. No violence or injury is to be offered him, whether he be Christian or pagan. Nay, we must not content ourselves with the narrow measures of bare justice; charity, bounty, and liberality must be added to it. This the Gospel enjoins, this reason directs, and this that natural fellowship we are born into requires of us. If any man err from the right way, it is his own misfortune, no injury to thee; nor therefore art thou to punish him in the things of this life because thou supposest he will be miserable in that which is to come." --John Locke, in "A Letter Concerning Toleration".

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Your defense of Walter Breen was admirable in principle, but I was slightly annoyed to find you more or less descending to the level of your opposition by calling Donaho the "ludicrous patriarch of the Church of the Brotherhood of the Way". That sort of nonsense is entirely unnecessary to an argument which is supposed to be based on reason and ethics rather than volume and vituperation. (I sincerely regret having included that remark in my original comments. Had Donaho been a Catholic or a Lutheran, it would never have occurred to me to raise the point of his religion in excoriating him for spearheading the crusade against Walt Breen. The fact that Donaho founded his own religion rather than

joining one of the major sects does not excuse my ethical transgression.))

According to "Publicola", "Man has no right to tinker and experiment with society", etc. We don't have any right, he says, to destroy the traditions of our fathers and grandfathers. Why not? An idea should be judged on its merits; a stupid or unworkable idea should be immediately discarded, whether it is brand new or has been in the family for x number of generations. Worth is not a consequence or synonym of tenure.

The "social contract" idea is also nonsense. The closest thing to this would be the obligation of a parent to its offspring, which motivates people to attempt to supply the best for their own children, whether that involves money, education, or social/political environment. By this line of thought, the obligation of man is to change whatever he considers "bad" about the society in which he lives, for his own benefit and that of future generations. We are certainly qualified to pass judgement on our ancestors' ideas; we are in a much more advantageous position than they were. Said ancestors don't have to live in the world of today and tomorrow; that is reserved for ourselves and the next generations. I certainly wouldn't destroy the Parthenon, but I wouldn't want to live there, either.

Oh ho! Now we start hedging--or rather, contradicting ourselves. "If there are elements in modern society which we find unpleasant or detrimental to the betterment of man...then it is our responsibility to change them." This is in direct contradiction to previous statements, inasmuch as this would involve (a) tinkering and experimenting with society, and (b) saying that our ancestors were wrong in some particulars. And let me point out that most of the detrimental and unpleasant elements in our society are a result of our ancestors' ideas and goals. For example, let us take the current civil rights stew. This is a result of the ideas and goals of a large number of our predecessors, the idea being that of white supremacy and the goal the reduction of the Negro race back into slavery--or at least into a sort of serfdom. This has been handed down to this day, with results with which all of us are familiar.

Publicola further says: "...it is with intuition and with emotion that man can make a contribution which is truly and uniquely human." Yes. I think Ayn Rand had a great deal to say on that score. The liberal may, when he decries prejudice, habit, and tradition, be decrying the fact that people are people, but does this excuse irrational prejudices, habits and traditions? I have no objection to prejudice, habit, and tradition, but I do expect them to be tempered with reason. I repeat that an idea should be judged on its merits. Merits are best considered through the use of logic, I would imagine. I am not in favor of reducing the human race to robotized zombies, or any other combination of scare-shibboleths, but I consider logic, which is also uniquely human, to be an excellent governor for emotion--and vice versa.

I see that I will be set upon and devoured by A. G. Smith for referring to his "racist theories". I made that statement on the basis of his letter in Kipple #56, which was the first issue that I received; but judging by his further comments in #57, I still think that his theories are racist. His statement in #56 was only slightly more refined than "I hate ---- n-----s". I have looked up racism in the dictionary; in the words of the Winston Dictionary in my lap, "racism" is "the doctrine that human races have distinctive make-ups that determine their respective cultures". I may be misinterpreting his views, but on the basis of the statements I have read in his letters to the last two issues of Kipple, I will continue to regard A. G. Smith's ideas as "racist".

I seriously doubt, also, that the Altoplano Indians are ignorant and uncooperative because they are the Altoplano Indians or because they are naturally any more stubborn than the rest of the human race. I imagine that the combination of environment and the natural conservatism that afflicts all backward peoples is to blame. Smith's disparaging remarks are about as logical as condemning someone who has lived all his life in, say, Russia, for his inability to speak perfect English.

Your editorial reply to Chay Borsella is beyond me. I fail to see how random contraception would markedly affect the percentage of genetically near-optimum births. (Lapsus mens.)

Your points on abortion are quite convincing, and show that my statements were somewhat hasty and ill-considered, and incompatible with the idea of the sanctity of human life, to which I happen to subscribe. However, your related arguments, on contraception, I will take issue with. The idea that each individual human personality is indispensable rejects death as a natural and necessary process--an idea held by entirely too many shallow thinkers, in which group you are obviously not included.

At any rate, I consider the equation of unique/irreplaceable with indispensable to be something of a non sequitur. The fact that a given human being is unique and irreplaceable does not mean that the human race won't be able to stumble along without him. A snowflake may be irreplaceable, but I am sure that the melting of snowflakes, individually and collectively, has no real effect on the operation of nature--though that's a very poor analogy.

Define personality for the moment as being a combination of a near-infinite number of factors interacting with each other and their environment. It seems to me, granting your premise about indispensability, that a potential contribution would be as valuable to the race as an existent one. By a process of reductio ad absurdum, the logical conclusion is that all contraception ought to be prohibited, thus allowing the largest possible number of personalities to come about. Unfortunately, there is a large and ugly pragmatic objection to this; as A. G. Smith pointed out in another connection, there is only so much room, and this policy would lead to a situation of standing room only.

So I'll have to reject your thesis that uniqueness equals indispensability. I will admit that as many different personalities as possible would be best for the race if practical, but a more pressing objective is the welfare of living human beings, individually and en masse. (My position has always been that a widespread program of contraception is of critical importance to the continued well-being of the human race. The uniqueness of human personality and the sanctity of human life are not valid arguments against this position, because prior to conception, nothing recognizable as an "individual" exists. (A foetus, no matter how primitive, is an individual, because all subsequent development is determined by the genetic blueprint created by the union of the sperm and the egg. Even the morula, the cluster of cells which constitutes the foetus for the first couple of days following conception, is therefore distinctly human and genetically unique. There is nothing which can be pointed to prior to conception, however, as an individual--even potentially; there is simply an egg and several million sperm, any one of which could fertilize the egg. On this basis, I have concluded that it is perfectly acceptable to prevent the union of the sperm and egg, but destroying the result of that union is equivalent to murdering a human being.) The argument which I offered against contraception--and which you rightly dismissed as untenable--was included not because I accept its validity, but because I thought it might interest some of the individuals who participated in the original debate about

the desirability of birth control. I can see how, to someone who had not been a reader of this periodical when that debate occurred, it would appear that I opposed contraception; but this is not the case.))

"The basic contradictions in Socialist society are still those between the relations of production and the productive forces and between the superstructure and the economic base. These contradictions, however, are fundamentally different in character and have different features from contradictions between the relations of production and the productive forces and between the superstructure and the economic base in the old societies. The present social system of our country is far superior to that of the old days. If this were not so, the old system would not have been overthrown and the new system could not have been set up." --Mao Tze-Tung, in "On the Correct handling of Contradictions Among the People".

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For many years I have disagreed with the mores of our culture that say we can love no more than one person of the opposite sex at one time, and have, in fact, felt such limitation of love to be rather horrible.

I first became acquainted with ideas of living a Way of Love in what I now call Churchianity, since I was literally raised in the church, my father being a Methodist Minister. Christ, at one point, had said that all the Law and the Prophets hang upon the commandment to love God and your neighbor as yourself. Paul summed it up at one point by saying that he that has loved has fulfilled the law; and one of modern day Judaism's leaders reiterated this idea. Of course, when you begin to talk about fulfilling or completing this love with the sexual experience, then you are adding something else; but I still feel that whatever is done, as long as it is done with love and consideration, it cannot be wrong. I have felt, then, that one could love to the point of sexual intimacy more than one at a time--even within one's own sex--and not do wrong.

Why, then, is love so limited? Do not deceit, greed, anger, lust, treachery, etc., etc., ad nauseam, flourish where love is lacking? What about Churchianity, the perpetrator of morals that say all sexual behavior except within a very narrow range is evil and blackly sinful; and which is, at the same time, so filled with greed and hypocrisy? So sex has been surrounded with all sorts of guilts and intercourse has been made a dirty word. No wonder people are afraid or unable to have a good sex-life. (Some of the early Christian sects incorporated the sex act in their living, by the way, and their living was a part of their Christian way, their worship.)

Here was one of the first observations I was able to make as I searched for some sort of answers to the questions of what was right and good and the way to live and love. This is a very sex-repressed culture. People seem to fear sex and love itself, and lack understanding of either. And people fear the unknown. So, to keep from being confronted with this monstrosity--sex--it has been made something to hide under the rug. And if it is hidden, how can anyone ever come to understand it? So it is understood less, and feared more, and so it goes.

Then why shouldn't love for more than one of the opposite sex, and just as many of one's own, be a good and desirable thing? Why shouldn't this love be spread, and why shouldn't it be completed with sexual intimacy? Perhaps the morals are correct; it may not be right. Then how does one find out? Just what sort of sexual behavior is natural

to the human animal--or was, before his mind felt it necessary to start placing taboos on it?

Since I have been studying anthropology, I have found some answers to the last question. They are very incomplete answers at best, but they have helped me to understand some of the riddles better. Following are some of my answers.

First, our closest relatives, evolution-wise, have been observed to engage in all types of sexual behavior. Some, like the Gibbon, a close relative of ours physiologically, are monogamous, and mate for life. Others seemingly have incest taboos between parents and offspring. Still others are observed to be homosexual, heterosexual, incestuous, masturbatory, promiscuous, polygamous, sometimes all at once. In fact, behavior like the Gibbons' is very much in the minority.

Then, when you observe the human, you can find all these types of behavior, except incest, quite prevalent, and you can find instances where there are lacks of incest taboos. (As, for instance, in the Samoan upper-classes, where siblings could have intercourse, and ancient Egypt, where a reverse taboo existed--the Pharaohs could marry only their closest relatives.) Instances of all these types of behavior can be found in our own culture, even incestuous relationships that are pleasing to those involved (except when the rest of society enters the picture and puts the offending parties in prison--I met one such, in jail, who honestly felt he had done no wrong and was a bit bewildered, finally deciding he must be sick because he had felt it to be good). So, since all of this behavior occurs where I can observe it, I must conclude that it is natural to the human species.

However, you could not say that man is no longer acting naturally when he represses his natural sexual tendencies, for man is by nature an irrational animal that places taboos upon his behavior. So, since taboos also occur, they must also be natural. But this is conflicting. How can both be natural and be so opposite? Where does this conflict between the biology and the mind arise? Since the biology seems fairly certain, let us examine taboos. Why taboos?

The best answer I have been able to come up with is as follows: For some reason I have not quite been able to fathom, man seems to be a tremendously insecure animal. Perhaps he is the only creature with enough intellectual ability to think of certain possibilities for a future that could leave him in doubt about his own well-being, the lower animals therefore being relatively incapable of being insecure. The "lower" animals don't have any idea how much they don't know about why the universe is here and why they are in it and how the whole damn machine runs, anyway, or at least they don't seem to. We seem to worry horribly because we don't know--but that's because we're insecure. Perhaps if we knew everything and could control everything, there would be no uncertainty and, therefore, no insecurity. We fear only what we do not know. We build up about ourselves certain patterns of "knowns" that we live within, and are secure within, because we know and can predict accurately. Then when something comes along that is outside of these "knowns", it strikes fear into us inasmuch as it contains possible threats to our existence, the possible threats being unknown to us. Until we come to know the unknown enough to feel safe in its presence, we tend to protect ourselves by repressing, suppressing, or denying the existence of it. And, as humans, we are constantly confronted with new things, as man's knowledge and machinery grows and takes him more and more out of the environment of Nature that once was his--particularly in these chaotic times of terrifically fast and far-reaching changes.

At any rate, there is this thing--insecurity--and man seems to try to compensate for it by maintaining that he is the "superior" animal, the end for which this universe was created. This seems to be a

rather unrealistic and far-fetched position. If it is unrealistic, then it can never be secure. A technique that could be used to try to give it some security would be to maintain that there is some universal moral principle that only men with their minds are capable of knowing that places certain restrictions upon his behavior. The existence of such a moral principle would prove that the other animals are lower than man, because they don't understand or know this principle--they don't have the intelligence; that is why we are "higher", because we have more intelligence. But proving our superiority in this way has meant that we have placed many restrictions on what would otherwise be natural, free, enjoyable behavior, perhaps filled with love and beauty. This has been turned away from, then, to being another of millions of sex-frustrated, sick, frigid people.

Lately I have been becoming part of a way of living and loving with my friends that is freeing itself from those restrictions that are being seen as not only un-natural, but downright horrible at times, in the way love is denied in favor of sickness and trouble.

For a long time, I have thought of group marriage situations, of cooperative living with a group of us raising children as offspring of the group, and all cooperating in our survival, social as well as physical. I have attempted twice now to get a house and a group of people together, and have made several mistakes in trying to force a way of living upon a group of people that didn't fit it; and I have seen mistakes of others. I have learned much, then, about group living.

Just lately I found myself becoming involved with several women in relationships full of love and sexual intimacy. I had not tried to create such a situation; it just happened, and here I was in the middle of it. I could not consider making any sort of choice between them, saying "Yes" to one and "No, we can't" to the rest. So I found myself in the position of being the trapped man. There was only one other way, and that was to love and have sexual relations with all at once.

I have seen now that the only really good way for some group marriage to come about would be if it just came about. And such a situation does seem to be coming about. I have recently been involved in several group love-making scenes that have been good because they happened in a good way. I don't think it would be a good idea to try to enforce these situations with any sort of marriage, group or otherwise. I have been involved in discussions--notably Channing Club--that have debated the pros and cons of group living, and have seen the impasse where it seems there are only two possibilities, both unworkable--that of group marriage for life, to insure that children are cared for, and that of freedom where people could leave if and when they wanted to. I think this is a mistake, that the best way is to do only what we feel like doing and are able to do. I'm all for the existing situation. I have never been as happy with people in my life. I have never been able to give and receive so much love. The consensus of opinion of those of us that have been so involved is that we are much better for it all, that we have gotten around many of our hang-ups about relating to other people. This is not to say, of course, that problems are non-existent with group intercourse. The problems are many and painful. I think the most painful event is that of adjusting to a way of life that is so diametrically opposite that to which we have been conditioned. But once it has truly become a way of life for us, I think the peaks of frustration and pain and anxiety will have been significantly lowered. And besides that, it is so great to be free to love whomever you wish and to feel free to talk about attraction you feel for someone else, without fearing upset with whomever you are "going-steady" with at the moment. Again, this doesn't guarantee there will be no upset, but when both of you have agreed you should feel free to have intercourse with whomever you desire,

you can bring everything into the light of day and don't have to feel guilty about doing something behind her (or his) back, which is something sort of destructive to human relations. I have tried to make this agreement with all those I have been involved with recently because I felt it as an ideal. It was hard to adjust to at first, but now I find it easier to live with, though I haven't made all the adjustments I need to. This agreement led to what was perhaps the most difficult adjustment for me to make. I have long been in the midst of a conflict as to whether I wanted to get married or not, first saying I wanted very much to find someone who would come along with me where I went and do things with me that I liked to do and love me, and then I would say it was too limiting--couldn't be done--things are pretty good now--I like the group marriage idea. But there have been too many insecurities in my unmarried life. I would like the security of knowing I had someone for sure to love and have intercourse with for life. Then I found someone who agreed with my ideas and ideals more closely than ever before, and this led me into a sublime sort of contradiction, for she was the very one I could never have forever because she, too, thought we should be free to have intercourse with whomever we wanted and go when and where we wanted. This has been difficult to adjust to, but I think I have now.

Where did this all begin, and just where are we? This is a time in which the sex-repression is being lifted. In no other time and place would we be so free to turn against the mainstream of the culture, to become a clot in it, an infection that could spread outward to the culture to transform it into a totally different way of life (and I don't think my sights are set too high). You often hear of these co-op ventures in the deserts or mountains somewhere, founded on some religious principle; but here we are in one of the largest metropolitan areas in the country, close to one of its best universities. Most bodies fight infections--even universities as liberal as Cal. It might be interesting to carry some case through the courts to try to show that we are not living in sin and irresponsibility, but in love and responsibility and consideration. (According to the note accompanying this mimeographed "letter", Kevin Langdon recommended that Mr. Artman forward his views on sex to me for possible publication in Kipple. I sense that Kevin is lightly tugging at my leg, but be that as it may I could hardly deprive my readers of a possible source of entertainment by refusing to print these remarks.)

"A practical man is a man who practices the errors of his forefathers." --Benjamin Disraeli.

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I've been doing some additional thinking about the conservatives' veneration of tradition since writing my last letter. It has always been the conservative position that a certain degree of eternal truth has been achieved and consequently certain attitudes and socio-political concepts are beyond criticism; and that society, though not perfect, is basically just, so that any fundamental change is more likely to do harm than good. The struggle between conservatism and radicalism has taken place on many battlefields, but this basic statement of conservative views has remained the same throughout history. The conservative has always hotly denied that the current orthodoxy is in need of basic revision; and he has always been wrong. There were conservatives in 1864, in 1464, conservatives in the court of Charlemagne, conservatives in the Roman Senate, conservatives in Imperial Egypt; and though the time predates recorded history, I imagine that there were conservatives when man

wore animal skins and lived in caves. Fortunately, the advice of these conservatives not to tinker and experiment with society has always been ignored, and I am confident that it will be ignored again. The great weakness of conservatism has been that it must, by definition, obstruct progress--an aim which demands the use of violence and the suppression of freedom.

What continually amazes me is the fact that the philosophy of conservatism still manages to attract intelligent people, despite its history of error. I equate conservatives as a breed with the doom-criers who carry signs promising the end of the world on a specific date and then, when the planet survives their deadline, simply update the prediction and continue to carry the damned signs, having learned nothing from the failure of the previous prediction. Conservatives have been "crying 'Wolf!'" for thousands of year, each generation maintaining that the orthodox social order needs no fundamental change; a few years later, when the society has been changed and thereby improved, the new crop of conservatives will freely admit that their fathers were wrong, but this in no way curbs their enthusiasm for stamping out heresy among their contemporaries. Conservatives today are saying, in effect: Adherents to our ideology have been saying for many centuries that no fundamental change was needed; naturally, they were wrong. But now we have arrived at the high point of human existence, and obviously no fundamental change is needed.

We are improving, though. Conservatives used to enforce their desire for stability with torture devices and royal prerogative, whereas today they are restricted (for the most part) to harsh words and voting for reactionary candidates.

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